



Chapter 3

Sentential Logic: Semantics

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



- ◆ We shall develop formal tests for *truth-functional* versions of logical concepts:
 - i) Truth-functional truth, falsity, and indeterminacy
 - ii) Truth-functional equivalence
 - iii) Truth-functional consistency
 - iv) Truth-functional entailment
 - v) Truth-functional validity
- ◆ *Recall*: Every sentence of SL can be built up from its atomic components.

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



- ◆ The truth-value of a sentence of SL is determined completely by the truth-values of its atomic components in accordance with the truth tables for the connectives:

P	Q	$\sim P$	$P \& Q$	$P \vee Q$	$P \supset Q$	$P \equiv Q$
T	T	F	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	F	T	F	F
F	T	T	F	T	T	F
F	F	T	F	F	T	T

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



- ◆ The truth-values of atomic sentences are fixed by truth-value assignments, i.e., by an assignment of a truth-value (T, F)
- ◆ If P has n atomic components, then there are 2^n different combinations of truth-values for its atomic components.
- ◆ A truth-table with n sentence letters, will have 2^n rows.

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



- ◆ For a truth table with n sentence letters, each column consists of 2^{n-i} 'T' s alternating with 2^{n-i} 'F' s.
- ◆ E.g., ' $\sim B \supset C$ ': two atomic components, 2^2 rows:

B C

T T

T F

F T

F F

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



‘ $(\sim B \supset C) \& (A \equiv B)$ ’ has three atomic components, so 2^3 ROWS:

<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>$(\sim B \supset C) \& (A \equiv B)$</u>
T	T	T	
T	T	F	
T	F	T	
T	F	F	
F	T	T	
F	T	F	
F	F	T	
F	F	F	

Rule of halves

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



E.g., ' $\sim[(U \vee (W \supset \sim U)) \equiv W]$ '



U	W	$\sim[(U \vee (W \supset \sim U)) \equiv W]$
T	T	F
T	F	T
F	T	F
F	F	T

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



- ◆ Sometimes we are not interested in determining the truth-values of a sentence P for every truth-value assignment, but only in the truth-value of P on some particular truth-value assignment.

E.g., ‘ $(A \ \& \ B) \supset B$ ’, where ‘ A ’ is false and ‘ B ’ is true:

<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>$(A \ \& \ B) \supset B$</u>
F	T	F F T T T

3.1 – Truth-Value Assignments and Truth-Tables for Sentences



- ◆ **Defn:** a sentence is *true on a truth-value assignment* iff it has the truth-value T on the truth-value assignment
- ◆ **Defn:** A sentence is *false on a truth-value assignment* iff it has the truth-value F on the truth-value assignment.

E.g., ‘ $(A \vee B) \supset B$ ’, where ‘A’ is true and ‘B’ is false:

<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>$(A \vee B) \supset B$</u>
T	F	T T F F F

3.2 – Truth-Functional Truth, Falsity, and Indeterminacy



- ◆ **Defn:** a sentence P of SL is *truth-functionally true iff* P is true on *every* truth-value assignment.

E.g., ‘ $C \vee \sim C$ ’

↓

C	$C \vee \sim C$
T	T T F T
F	F T T F

3.2 – Truth-Functional Truth, Falsity, and Indeterminacy



- ◆ *Defn*: a sentence of P of SL is *truth-functionally false iff P is false on every truth-value assignment.*



E.g., ‘ $P \ \& \ \sim P$ ’

<u>P</u>	<u>P & ~P</u>
T	T F FT
F	F F TF

3.2 – Truth-Functional Truth, Falsity, and Indeterminacy



- ◆ Negate a truth-functionally true sentence and the result is truth-functionally false, and vice versa for a truth-functionally false sentence.

E.g., ‘ $P \vee \sim P$ ’

↓

<u>P</u>	<u>$\sim(P \vee \sim P)$</u>				
T	F	T	T	F	T
F	F	F	T	T	F

‘ $\sim \sim(P \vee \sim P)$ ’ is truth-functionally true

3.2 – Truth-Functional Truth, Falsity, and Indeterminacy



- ◆ *Defn*: a sentence P is *truth-functionally indeterminate* iff P is neither truth-functionally true nor truth-functionally false.
- ◆ Each atomic sentence of SL is truth-functionally indeterminate.

3.2 – Truth-Functional Truth, Falsity, and Indeterminacy



- ‘ $A \supset (B \supset A)$ ’ is truth-functionally true
- ‘ $(A \supset B) \supset A$ ’ is truth-functionally indeterminate

		↓			↓				
<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>$A \supset (B \supset A)$</u>			<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>$(A \supset B) \supset A$</u>		
T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
T	F	T	T	F	T	F	T	F	T
F	T	F	T	T	F	T	F	T	F
F	F	F	T	F	F	F	F	F	F

3.2 – Truth-Functional Truth, Falsity, and Indeterminacy



- ◆ We can show that a sentence is *not* truth-functionally (t-f) true (or false) by showing that there is at least one row which yields the truth-value false (or true).

E.g.,

<u>A</u>	<u>(A & ~A) ∨ ~A</u>
T	T F F T F F T

This truth table shows that the sentence is not t-f true.

E.g.,

<u>A</u>	<u>(A & ~A) ∨ ~A</u>
F	F F T F T T F

This truth table shows that the sentence is not t-f false.

3.3 – Truth-Functional Equivalence



- ◆ **Defn:** Sentences P and Q are *truth-functionally equivalent* iff there is *no* truth-value assignment on which P and Q have different truth-values, i.e., *iff* the columns under the main connective are identical.

E.g., ‘ $(W \ \& \ Y) \supset H$ ’ and ‘ $W \supset (Y \supset H)$ ’

3.3 – Truth-Functional Equivalence



W	Y	H	$(W \& Y) \supset H$	$W \supset (Y \supset H)$
T	T	T	T	T
T	T	F	F	F
T	F	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	T
F	T	T	T	T
F	T	F	T	T
F	F	T	T	T
F	F	F	T	T

3.3 – Truth-Functional Equivalence



- ◆ Any two truth-functionally true (or false) sentences are truth-functionally equivalent.

E.g., ‘ $(P \vee \sim P)$ ’ and ‘ $\sim(B \& \sim B)$ ’

<u>P</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>$P \vee \sim P$</u>	<u>$\sim(B \& \sim B)$</u>
T	T	T	T
T	F	T	T
F	T	T	T
F	F	T	T

3.4 – Truth-Functional Consistency



- ◆ We denote a set of sentences Γ as $\{S_1 \dots S_k\}$, where S_i are the members, e.g., $\Gamma = \{A, B \supset H, C \vee A\}$
- ◆ *Defn*: a set of sentences of SL is *truth-functionally consistent* iff there is *at least one* truth-value assignment on which all the members of the set are true.
- ◆ *Defn*: A set of sentences of SL is *truth-functionally inconsistent* iff it is not truth-functionally consistent
 - ◆ i.e., iff there is *no* truth-value assignment on which all the members of the set are true.

3.4 – Truth-Functional Consistency



E.g., $\{A, B \supset H, B\}$

A	B	H	A	B \supset H	B
T	T	T	T	T	T

← can stop here

E.g., $\{L, L \supset J, \sim J\}$

L	J	L	L \supset J	$\sim J$
T	T	T	T	F
T	F	T	F	T
F	T	F	T	F
F	F	F	T	T

This set is truth-functionally inconsistent.

3.5 – Truth-Functional Entailment and Truth-Functional Validity



- ◆ *Defn*: a set Γ of sentences of SL *truth-functionally entails* a sentence \mathbf{P} *iff* there is *no* truth-value assignment on which every member of Γ is true and \mathbf{P} is false, i.e., \mathbf{P} is true on every truth-value assignment where every member of Γ is true.
- ◆ We denote Γ truth-functionally entails \mathbf{P} by $\Gamma \models \mathbf{P}$.

3.5 – Truth-Functional Entailment and Truth-Functional Validity



E.g., $\{A, A \& B\} \models B$:

<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>A & B</u>	<u>B</u>
T	T	T	T	T
T	F	T	F	F
F	T	F	F	T
F	F	F	F	F

3.5 – Truth-Functional Entailment and Truth-Functional Validity



E.g., ‘ $\{A, A \vee B\}$ ’ does not entail ‘ B ’:

<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>A \vee B</u>	<u>B</u>
T	T	T	T	T
T	F	T	T	F ←
F	T	F	T	T
F	F	F	F	F

3.5 – Truth-Functional Entailment and Truth-Functional Validity



- ◆ If there is *one* truth-value assignment on which every member of Γ is true but P is false, then Γ does not entail P , even if there is an assignment on which every member of Γ is true and P is true.
- ◆ The expression ‘ $\vDash P$ ’ is an abbreviation for ‘ $\emptyset \vDash P$ ’
- ◆ The empty set entails all and only truth-functionally true sentences. (Since there is no assignment to \emptyset , there is no assignment on which Γ is true and P is false.)

3.5 – Truth-Functional Entailment and Truth-Functional Validity



- ◆ *Defn*: An argument of SL is *truth-functionally valid* iff there is *no* truth value assignment on which the premises are true and the conclusion is false.
- ◆ *Defn*: An argument of SL is truth-functionally invalid iff it is not truth-functionally valid.
- ◆ An *argument* is truth-functionally valid iff the *set* composed of the premises truth-functionally entails the conclusion.

3.5 – Truth-Functional Entailment and Truth-Functional Validity



- ◆ For any argument of SL that has a finite number of premises, we may look for a sentence called the corresponding *material conditional*:

$$P_1 \quad ((P_1 \ \& \ P_2) \ \& \ P_3) \supset C$$

P_2

P_3

C

- ◆ The argument is truth-functionally valid *iff* the corresponding material conditional is truth-functionally true.

3.5 – Truth-Functional Entailment and Truth-Functional Validity



A

A \supset B

B

is truth-functionally valid iff '[A & (A \supset B)] \supset B' is truth-functionally true



<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>[A & (A \supset B)] \supset B</u>						
T	T	T	T	T	T	T		
T	F	T	F	T	F	F	T	F
F	T	F	F	F	T	T	T	T
F	F	F	F	F	T	F	T	F

3.6 – Truth-Functional Properties and Truth-Functional Consistency



◆ Recasting the truth-functional notions in terms of *truth-functional consistency*:

- i) A sentence \mathbf{P} is *truth-functionally false* iff $\{\mathbf{P}\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.
- ii) A sentence \mathbf{P} is *truth-functionally true* iff $\{\sim\mathbf{P}\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.
- iii) A sentence \mathbf{P} is *truth-functionally indeterminate* iff both $\{\sim\mathbf{P}\}$ and $\{\mathbf{P}\}$ are truth-functionally consistent.

3.6 – Truth-Functional Properties and Truth-Functional Consistency



- ◆ *Proof:* A sentence \mathbf{P} is *truth-functionally false* iff $\{\mathbf{P}\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

Suppose \mathbf{P} is truth-functionally false.

No truth-value assignment on which \mathbf{P} is true (*defn*).

No truth-value assignment on which every member of $\{\mathbf{P}\}$ is true. (\mathbf{P} is the only member of $\{\mathbf{P}\}$.)

Hence, $\{\mathbf{P}\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

3.6 – Truth-Functional Properties and Truth-Functional Consistency



- ◆ *Proof:* A sentence P is *truth-functionally true* iff $\{\sim P\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

Suppose P is truth-functionally true.

P is true on every truth-value assignment (*defn*).

$\sim P$ is true on no truth-value assignment. ($\sim P$ is false on every truth-value assignment.)

No truth-value assignment on which every member of $\{\sim P\}$ is true. ($\sim P$ is the only member of $\{\sim P\}$.)

Hence, $\{\sim P\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

3.6 – Truth-Functional Properties and Truth-Functional Consistency



- ◆ P and Q are *truth-functionally equivalent* iff $P \equiv Q$ is truth-functionally true
- ◆ $P \equiv Q$ is *truth-functionally true* iff $\{\sim(P \equiv Q)\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent
- ◆ P and Q are *truth-functionally equivalent* iff $\{\sim(P \equiv Q)\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

3.6 – Truth-Functional Properties and Truth-Functional Consistency



A	B	$\sim[(A \vee B) \equiv (\sim A \supset B)]$	
T	T	F	T
T	F	F	T
F	T	F	T
F	F	F	T

$\{\sim[(A \vee B) \equiv (\sim A \supset B)]\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

Hence, $(A \vee B)$ and $(\sim A \supset B)$ are truth-functionally equivalent.

3.6 – Truth-Functional Properties and Truth-Functional Consistency



- ◆ If $\Gamma \vDash \mathbf{P}$, for some sentence \mathbf{P} and set of sentences Γ , then $\Gamma \cup \{\sim\mathbf{P}\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.
- ◆ $\Gamma \vDash \mathbf{P}$, that is, Γ *truth-functionally entails* \mathbf{P} iff $\Gamma \cup \{\sim\mathbf{P}\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

3.6 – Truth-Functional Properties and Truth-Functional Consistency



An argument

$$\begin{array}{l} P_1 \\ P_2 \\ \underline{P_k} \\ C \end{array}$$

is *truth-functionally valid* iff $\{P_1 \dots P_k\} \cup \{\sim C\}$ is truth-functionally inconsistent.

E.g.,

$$\begin{array}{l} (A \supset D) \ \& \ H \\ \underline{F \vee H} \\ D \end{array}$$

is valid iff $\{(A \supset D) \ \& \ H, F \vee H, \sim D\}$ is t-f inconsistent.